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Abstract: The concept of organizational stigma has received significant attention in recent 
years. The theoretical literature suggests that for a stigma to emerge over a category of 
organizations, a “critical mass” of actors sharing the same beliefs should be reached. Scholars 
have yet to empirically examine the techniques used to diffuse this negative judgment. This 
study is aimed at bridging this gap by investigating Goffman’s notion of “stigma-theory”: 
how do stigmatizing actors rationalize and emotionalize their beliefs to convince their 
audience? We answer this question by studying the stigma over the finance industry since 
2007. After the subprime crisis, a succession of events put the industry under greater scrutiny, 
and the behaviors and values observed within this field began to be publicly questioned. As an 
empirical strategy, we collected opinion articles and editorials that specifically targeted the 
finance industry. Building on rhetorical analysis and other mixed methods of media content 
analysis, we explain how the stigmatizing rhetoric targets the origins of deviant organizational 
behaviors in the finance industry, that is, the shareholder-value maximization logic. We 
bridge the gap between rhetorical strategies applied to discredit organizations and ones used 
to delegitimize institutional logics by drawing a parallel between these two literatures. Taking 
an abductive approach, we argue that institutional contradiction between field and societal-
level logics is sufficient but not necessary to generate organizational stigma. 
 
Keywords: organizational stigma; institutional logics; shareholder-value maximization; 
rhetoric; banks; discourse. 
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Introduction 
In November 2010, the New Yorker journalist John Cassidy wrote an opinion piece 
entitled “What Good is Wall Street?”. “Greed is good” was no longer flavor of the month... 
outside the banking industry. Gordon Gekko’s motto in Wall Street - Oliver Stone’s mythical 
movie on the rise and fall of voracious bankers – now epitomizes everything one hates about 
the banks. Paradoxically, although Gekko is depicted as a wolfish, devilish and tempting 
patron, because he symbolizes the bankers’ line of reasoning, he can be perceived as a role 
model by aspirant bankers, such as Erhardt Moritz, the Bank of America’s intern who died by 
overwork (Gysin, 2013) or confirmed ones, such as Jordan Belfort, the “Wolf of Wall Street” 
(Leonard, 2008). Gekko’s mindset is regarded in a diametrically opposed way inside and 
outside the field of banking. May this divergence in norms inside and outside a field be 
understood as a source of the banks’ public disgrace? 
Building on the fundamental work of Erving Goffman (1963), who was the first to 
explore the antecedents and outcome of stigma, a new field of research inquiry has recently 
emerged around the concept of organizational stigma. Like individuals, organizations are also 
subject to disqualification from full social acceptance. Consequently, scholars have been 
trying to build a comprehensive definition of organizational stigma that distinguishes it from 
individual-level stigma and other close constructs such as reputation, illegitimacy, or status 
(Devers, Dewett, Mishina and Belsito, 2009). Organizational stigma has been defined as “a 
label that evokes a collective stakeholder group-specific perception that an organization 
possesses a fundamental, deep-seated flaw that deindividuates and discredits the organization” 
(Devers et al., 2009:155). The stigmatized organization is thus “caricatured as an embodiment 
of values that explicitly conflict with those of the stakeholder group” (ibid: 157). The central 
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antecedent of organizational stigma is thus the conflict of values and behaviors between a 
category of organization and a set of stakeholders. 
Organizational stigma relies on stereotyping and emerges when “a critical mass of 
stakeholder group members” reaches this categorization (Devers et al. 2009: 162). However, 
there has been very little investigation on how this critical mass is reached and how the group 
initiating the stigmatization process tries to spread its beliefs among other stakeholders. More 
specifically, how are these beliefs rationalized to be more convincing? 
An industry earns a negative label when it violates norms (Pozner, 2008; Hudson, 
2008). Such situations occur when its practices are in conflict with broader social norms 
(Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975) and threaten the existing social structure (Mishina and Devers, 
2011). From an institutional logic perspective, we distinguish institutional logics – systems of 
shared beliefs and values – at different levels of analysis, in particular at the industry or field-
level but also at the broader society-level (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008; Thornton, Ocasio and 
Lounsbury, 2012). The “appropriate practices” at the industry level, which potentially conflict 
with social norms, are derived from field-level institutional logics (Thornton and Ocasio, 
2008). An industry’s acceptability depends on the appraisal of its dominant logic, and 
industries originally build their legitimacy by translating established societal-level logic into 
their field: one example is the tobacco industry adopting practices derived from the free-
market logic (Galvin, Ventresca and Hudson, 2004). However, when societal-level logics 
evolve, for example because of economic crises, inconsistencies between the industry’s logic 
and societal-level logics may arise (Seo and Creed, 2002). The appropriate practices at the 
field level, as a result of being derived from a freshly contested logic, were negatively labeled 
as a consequence of the institutional contradiction. 
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Meanwhile, there is a close connection between rhetoric and the legitimacy of 
institutional logics: the contestation of logics is mainly built on rhetorical discourses, which 
challenge the legitimacy of the condemned logic (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005). Rhetoric 
is a set of tactics used to persuade others. However, these tactics are not only informative 
about the way we communicate with others but also about the way we think (Watson, 1995). 
Discourse is not merely a form of expression but also a process through which organizational 
behaviors are enacted or constrained (Grant, Keenoy and Oswick, 1998; Phillips and Hardy, 
2002). In other words, tracking rhetorical discourses is a way of understanding the 
institutional conflicts at stake. To apprehend stigma as a phenomenon, we endeavor to 
understand how rhetorical strategies connect a stigmatized industry’s behaviors and values, 
and the underlying field-level logic. 
Because media are a barometer of how logics are perceived and comprehended (Lok, 
2010) by giving salience to specific perspectives (Riaz, Buchanan and Bapuji, 2011), we 
investigate the negative labeling of the finance industry in opinion and editorial articles 
collected from three major U.S. newspapers from 2007 and 2011. Crisis narratives in the 
media have played an important role shaping the direction of institutional change (Riaz, et al. 
2011). In this study, we investigate the different means of persuasion used to discredit logics 
used by the media themselves, building on an Aristotelian typology of rhetorical strategies.  
The paper is structured in four sections. First, we establish our theoretical lens by 
unfolding an institutional logic theory of organizational stigma. Second, we present our 
research setting by discussing the history of the finance industry and the emergence of a 
dominant field-level logic. Then, building on rhetorical and other methods of content analysis, 
we empirically examine how stigmatization and institutional resistance are interlaced. We 
show that stigmatizing actors primarily attack underlying logics rather than the organizations 
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enacting them. Through the Aristotelian lens, we explain how stigmatizing judgment is at the 
same time “rationalized” (logos) and “emotionalized” (pathos). Our abductive approach 
concludes that a conflict between field-level and societal-level logics is a sufficient but not 
necessary condition to generate organizational stigma. 
Theoretical background 
Drawing on autobiographies and case studies, Goffman (1968) was among the first to 
scientifically examine the concept of stigma. He used this notion to describe attributes that 
disqualify individuals from social acceptance. These attributes can be physical (e.g., 
deformation, mental illness) or related to social practices (e.g., drug consumption). Goffman’s 
concept of “courtesy” stigma or stigma by association (Goffman, 1968) has been empirically 
explored in the more recent literature. Building on this founding work, management scholars 
have developed a comprehensive perspective on the antecedents and outcomes of individual-
level stigma in organizational contexts (Ashforth and Kreiner, 1999; Kulik, Bainbridge and 
Cregan, 2008). In particular, Wiesenfeld and Wurthman (2008) and Sutton and Callahan 
(1987) looked at how corporate failure contributes to the stigmatization of the associated 
executives. Ashforth and Kreiner (1999) showed how the stigma associated with disdained 
professional activities - referred to as 'dirty work’ - affected workers. However, while several 
firm-related scandals and disasters have received notable public attention, the term stigma has 
also begun to be applied to organizations. 
Organizational stigma 
According to Devers et al. (2009), the main difference between individual-level and 
organizational-level stigma is that getting stigmatized is an active process in the latter case. 
Stigma at the individual level is passively acquired in the sense that stigmatized individuals 
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have done nothing except possessing a negatively perceived attribute they have not asked for 
(Link and Phelan, 2001). By contrast, stigmatized organizations have at some point taken a 
decision leading to this situation (e.g., whether to engage in morally condemnable activities), 
Organizational stigma is the result of a categorization process: an organization is stigmatized 
when it is associated with a negatively evaluated group of organizations (Devers et al., 2009; 
Mishina and Devers, 2011) the classic example being an industry (Vergne, 2012; Durand and 
Vergne, 2014). Categories enable social actors to simplify the interpretation of their 
environment (Corter and Gluck, 1992; Durand and Paolella, 2013). Social actors would use a 
set of characteristics to classify an organization, associate it with a group and subsequently 
adopt what appears to be the most adapted behavior (Durand and Paolella, 2013): some 
stakeholders would for example distance themselves from organizations they link in some 
way to the arms industry (Vergne, 2012; Durand and Vergne, 2014). In a nutshell, an 
organization is stigmatized when it belongs to a broader stigmatized category (Wiesenfeld, 
Wurthman and Hambrick, 2008). 
Although the process by which a firm becomes stigmatized has not been studied 
empirically (Mishina and Devers, 2011), scholars have begun theorizing the origin of 
organizational stigma. Devers, Dewett, Mishina, and Belsito (2009) use the concept of critical 
mass: stigma emerges on the condition that this vilifying belief has been diffused among a 
critical mass of stakeholders. This perspective relies on the idea that common beliefs tend to 
diffuse among a social network of structurally equivalent actors (Abrahamson and Fombrun, 
1994). According to Hudson (2008), there are two distinct types of stigmas: event stigmas are 
punctual while core stigmas are permanent features of organizations. Event stigmas are 
related to episodic events, while core stigmas are more deeply anchored and suggest that the 
very nature of the organization is flawed. However, there has been no research on how event 
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stigmas become core stigmas—how can the multiplication of event stigmas, including 
preconceived ones, engrave negative evaluations in any appraisal of an organization? 
More generally, how is this “critical mass” (Devers et al., 2009) of actors sharing the 
same stigmatizing belief achieved? The manner in which one stakeholder group’s view can 
tend to dominate and come to result in organizational stigma has yet to be fully explored 
empirically (Link and Phelan, 2001). The current literature particularly fails to explain the 
processes through which the stigmatizing actors endeavor to sustain their point of view. 
Goffman (1963:5) argued that we should construct a “stigma-theory,” that is, “an ideology to 
explain [one’s] inferiority and account for the danger [one] represents, sometimes 
rationalizing an animosity based on [one’s] differences.” The more convincing the stigma-
theory, the more the diffusion of labeling of a category of organizations. 
The theoretical basis of organizational stigma is related to labeling theory (Devers et 
al., 2009), which suggests that negative labeling is associated with deviance from norms 
rather than the inherent characteristics or actions of the labeled person or group (Ashforth and 
Humphrey, 1997). 
Norm violation and industry-level logics 
Stigmatization of industries is the result of norm violation (Pozner, 2008; Hudson, 
2008); the moral worth of their conduct and principles is questioned, particularly because they 
potentially threaten the existing social structure (Mishina and Devers, 2011; Goffman, 1963). 
Organizational stigma is not developed from behaviors themselves but from interpretations of 
behaviors; stigmatization is the result of others’ interpretations of an organization’s behavior 
(Kitsuse, 1962; Mishina and Devers, 2011), in particular when those behaviors are seen as in 
conflict with the values of the stakeholders who apprehend them (Devers, et al. 2009). 
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The violation of norms by industry members is driven by “industry recipes” (Galvin et 
al., 2004:72), that is, practices that are considered appropriate by the other members of a field. 
An industry is an inter-organizational field where legitimacy processes are rooted in “local” 
belief systems (Galvin, Ventresca and Hudson, 2004; Friedland and Alford, 1991). Strong 
boundary beliefs contribute to developing industry-specific logics of action in relation to 
various stakeholders (Galvin et al. 2004; Thornton and Ocasio, 1999). The emergence of an 
industry’s collective identity leads to the development of logics—socially constructed systems 
of assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules—that prevail within the social group (Thornton and 
Ocasio, 2008; Thornton, et al. 2012). There can be two logics competing in the same industry 
(Lounsbury, 2007; Dunn and Jones, 2010). For example, Dunn and Jones (2010) identify the 
competing logics of care and science in the medical education sector. Most of the time, 
however, industries are ruled by a “dominant logic” (Nigam and Ocasio, 2010), that is, a logic 
that drives the industry’s “macroculture” (Abrahamson and Fombrun, 1994) or “mindset” 
(Phillips, 1994). For example, the tobacco industry is ruled by a free-market logic (Galvin, et 
al. 2004), or the hospital industry gave prominence to the managed care logic after the 
Clinton’s health care reform proposal in 1993 (Nigam and Ocasio, 2010). These industry-
level logics tend to promote and reinforce specific practices and assumptions while devaluing 
others (Porac et al., 2002). From an institutional logic perspective, institutions provide actors 
with a set of social norms that define relevant and suitable behaviors. These “industry recipes” 
spread and affect individuals and organizations when they identify with the collective identity 
of the industry (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; March and Olsen, 1989; Thornton and Ocasio, 
2008); that is, the connection experienced by a social group’s members increases the 
likelihood of their abiding by its norms of behaviors and logics of action (March and Olsen, 
1989). 
Stigma resulting from institutional contradiction 
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How can we explain norm violation from an institutional logic perspective? Any social 
context may be influenced by multiple competing logics, and if these competing logics result 
in institutional change (Thornton and Occasio, 2008; Thornton, et al. 2012), they first lead to 
institutional contradictions when they are mutually incompatible (Seo and Creed, 2002). 
Conversely, with the exception of Marquis and Lounsbury (2007) and Herremans, Heschovis 
and Bertels (2009), the literature on institutional contradiction and competing logics has 
mainly focused on institutional change as a natural outcome and neglected to look at the 
period when logics compete with each other before a change can occur. Oliver (1991) 
acknowledged the lack of research on resistance to institutional pressures. Indeed, institutional 
contradiction may actually lead to a dead end when the competing logics continue contending 
with each other (Herremans et al. 2009). For example, actors can be seen as rational 
opportunists who trigger institutional change if it enhances their self-interest (Seo and Creed, 
2002); in this context, industry actors will refuse institutional change if it harms their 
interests. 
Likewise, an industry initially attains legitimacy by deriving “recipes” from widely 
accepted societal-level logics, to gain legitimacy (Galvin et al., 2004). Such societal-level 
logic can be economically based, such as the shareholder value maximization logic (Ho; 
2009), or the free market logic (Galvin, et al. 2004), but can also take roots in other cultural 
systems such as religion (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Gümüsay, 2014). Organizational 
legitimacy is the “congruence between the social values associated with or implied by [the 
organization’s] activities and the norms of acceptable behavior in the larger social system” 
(Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975:122). Galvin, Ventresca, and Hudson (2004) move from 
organizational legitimacy to industry legitimacy by arguing that the appraisal of an industry’s 
behavior focuses on an evaluation of that industry’s dominant logic. In other words, an 
industry is considered legitimate if the practices driven by its dominant logic are congruent 
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with wider social norms. These social norms are based on higher-order ideologies and logics 
(Friedland and Alford, 1991). For example, the tobacco industry has tried to legitimize itself 
despite its stigmatizing attributes by building some of its recipes on the dominant societal 
logic of free market and free enterprise (Galvin et al., 2004). However, these societal logics 
are subject to change: for example, economic crises are likely to bend dominant ideologies 
(Seo and Creed, 2002). This gives birth to institutional contradictions: the new societal logic 
may be inconsistent with the previously established field-level logics. In that case, these 
industry recipes—previously legitimized by their higher-order ideological roots—get marked 
out. Finally, such a situation makes the industry a stigmatized one. Figure 1 summarizes this 
process. 
----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
----------------------------------------------- 
Rhetoric plays a crucial role in legitimizing or delegitimizing institutional logics: 
rhetorical discourses are an embodiment of institutional conflict (Suddaby and Greenwood, 
2005). Rhetoric is defined as the array of strategies used to persuade others of the validity of 
specific arguments (Watson, 1995). Analyzing rhetoric aids the understanding of the manner 
in which arguments are used to build audience consensus (Zanoni and Janssen, 2004). By 
looking at rhetorical tactics, we can examine how institutional contradiction and 
organizational stigma are intertwined. In particular, how do rhetorical strategies connect a 
stigmatized industry’s behaviors and values, and the underlying field-level logic? 
Research setting: the stigma over the finance industry 
The rise of a dominant industry-level logic in the investment banking industry 
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In much the manner as in the tobacco industry (Galvin et al., 2004), the industry-level 
logic in the investment banking industry initially developed from societal-level logic (Fraser, 
2004; Ho, 2009). The tobacco industry has gained social acceptability by supporting the 
dominant societal logic of free markets (Galvin et al., 2004). As stated by the historian Steve 
Fraser (2004), the investment banking industry has been declining for forty years after the 
Great Crash of 1929, when shareholding and its associated values were perceived as 
dangerous (Ho, 2009:199). According to the anthropologist Karen Ho, who wrote a complete 
ethnography of Wall Street in 2009, investment banks have taken advantage of the takeover 
movement of the 1980s to rebuild their legitimacy. 
To gain social acceptance, the investment banking industry has borrowed as much as 
possible from a societal logic that was gaining momentum at that time: the shareholder value 
maximization logic (Ho, 2009). A flourishing corpus of literature has explained how this logic 
became a dominant guiding principle in the 1980s and 1990s (Fligstein, 2001; Lok, 2010; Ho, 
2009). According to Lok (2010), the logic of shareholder value maximization developed as an 
answer to the economic problems faced by the U.S. in the 1970s. Agency theory emerged as a 
reaction against supposedly wasteful and hubristic managers’ practices, as epitomized by the 
irrational emergence and strengthening of conglomerates until the 1970s. The 
restructuring/takeover phenomenon of the 1980s gave momentum to the shareholder value 
maximization logic (Whitman, 1999; Stout, 2012). This new logic asserts that the only 
legitimate purpose of a firm is to maximize the return to shareholders in terms of dividends 
and increases in share price (Fligstein, 2001; Whitman, 1999). 
In her ethnography, Karen Ho demonstrates how workplace culture, shared beliefs and 
assumptions, and privileges of investment bankers, including compensations, are derived from 
the shareholder value maximization logic. She presents investment bankers as members of a 
 !
12 
social group who strongly identify with this group. Stein (2011) uses the concept of a “culture 
of mania” to explain the incubation of the financial crisis, and the feeling of “omnipotence”. 
The U.S. subprime crisis and the fall of Lehman Brothers in 2008 was a turning point. 
Because they received the help of the state and were singled out for their role and 
responsibility during the crisis, the banks and their practices came under greater scrutiny. 
The disapprobation of the U.S. investment banking industry 
In fall 2008, following Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy and Merrill Lynch’s acquisition 
by Bank of America, the two largest investment banks—Goldman Sachs and Morgan 
Stanley—asked to become bank holding companies (a bank holding company is a company 
that controls a bank, and is regulated and supervised by the Fed) and were quickly followed 
by other actors of the banking industry. This increased state regulation made it easier for those 
banks to raise capital and survive. In addition, several bank bailouts followed. The U.S. 
government purchased $250 billion worth of bank equity shares including those of Citigroup, 
AIG, Bank of America, JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, PNC, US Bancorp, 
Bank of New York Mellon, or American Express. 
After the banks reimbursed taxpayers’ money, concerns about bonus payments in the 
banking industry, in particular at AIG (which received a significant share of the bailout 
funds), grew stronger. Several other scandals came to light. It has been suggested that 
taxpayers’ money was used by stronger banks to buy weaker ones, and that little control was 
exerted over the use of this money. Indeed, according to Reuters, $114 million of the bailout 
plan was used in lobbying. In December 2008, an Associated Press study revealed that banks 
that benefited from bailouts distributed $1.6 billion in bonuses, stock options, and other 
benefits to their top executives. Andrew Cuomo, New York’s attorney general, investigated 
this point (Cuomo, 2009); Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan were singled out for providing 200 
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employees with more than $3 million in bonuses. Goldman Sachs was also incriminated for 
making tremendous profits by betting on the collapse of the subprime market in 2007. 
The behaviors attacked in the media were typical of the investment banking industry 
in that they relied on the “high risk, high reward” culture (Ho, 2009). The media played an 
important role in drawing public attention to bankers’ practices, behaviors, and values. Recent 
research has identified the crucial role of media in pinpointing norm violation (Mulvey and 
Padilla, 2010; Padilla, 2012) for example in the case of the Penn State scandal (Thoroughgood 
and Padilla, 2013). As suggested by Fiss and Hirsch (2005), the media assist in the 
construction of social realities and consequently draw public support—or disapproval—
towards existing systems of beliefs and values. By presenting rational schemes of thoughts 
and realities as legitimate or illegitimate, the media convey the pressures exerted on logics 
(Lok, 2010). Media have thus contributed to spreading the condemnation of the dominant 
logic in the investment banking industry by portraying bankers “as being both avaricious and 
incompetent figures, who earned vast salaries and bonuses while taking enormous foolhardy 
financial risks” (Hargie,  Stapleton and Tourish, 2010).  
Methods, data collection, and analysis 
To understand how arguments are built against the stigmatized category of 
organizations, we look at one of the main diffusion channels: the media. Indeed, the media 
play a crucial role in the diffusion processes (Koopmans and Olzak, 2004). According to Max 
Weber, media reflect the “cultural temperature” of society (Hansen, Cottle, Negrine and 
Newbold, 1998, p. 92); they are of particular interest for organization theorists and 
sociologists, because they reveal how logics are understood and apprehended (Lok, 2010). In 
1927, the political scientist Harold Lasswell was the first to use media content analysis as a 
subset of content analysis to study propaganda (Lasswell, 1971). Following Riaz et al. (2011), 
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we focus on media framing and how it engages with the institutional context. The way media 
make sense of events plays an important role in shaping social reality (Reese, Gandy, and 
Grant, 2001). There are ways in which issues are presented (“frames”) that can strongly affect 
the public opinion (Chong and Druckman, 2007). Here, our objective is to describe and relate 
form characteristics to substance characteristics of stigmatizing contents so we can understand 
how media endeavor to persuade readers. Consequently, we resort to a specific type of 
qualitative media content analysis: rhetorical analysis. 
Despite notable exceptions (e.g., Watson, 1995; Nørreklit, 2000; Zanoni and Janssens, 
2004; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005), rhetorical analysis is more commonly used in 
communication studies than in organization theory and sociology (Hijmans, 2006). Rhetoric is 
about using language for persuasion (Watson, 1995), and rhetorical analysis is a form of 
critical reading that focuses on the understanding of the persuasive intent of texts (Jelzer, 
2004). It implies that to gain some perspective during the reading, one should appreciate the 
tactics as a neutral reader. Rhetorical analysis is usually both textual and contextual: it 
requires one to consider not only the details of the text but also the context in which it has 
been written (Jelzer, 2004). 
Data collection 
To conduct our content analysis, we collected a sample of opinion articles from 
newspapers. Exclusively targeting opinion and editorial articles rather than factual pieces 
enables us to select texts aimed at making a case—here, the claim is that investment banks are 
socially flawed. Opinion and editorial articles are either written by external columnists, who 
are usually considered as having legitimate knowledge about the topic they examine, or 
members of the editorial staff. In these types of commentaries, the authors endeavor to 
convince; that is, they make their case compelling by appealing to the rationality of the reader. 
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We used a Factiva command stream1 to target opinion articles and editorials that 
focused on the finance industry, in a broader sense. In particular, we included the banking 
industry from investment to retail banks, but also the fund industry, as a number of editorials 
were targeting the hedge fund sub-field, while in the meantime considering it as part of the 
broader finance industry. Later on, we discuss the changing scope of targets as one of the 
stigmatizing strategy. 
Consistent with previous research (Fiss and Hirsch, 2005), we focused on the three 
major U.S. newspapers: the New York Times (NYT), the Wall Street Journal (WSJ), and the 
Washington Post (WP). We also sampled articles from USA today, but considering that they 
tended to be exclusively factual, we decided not to include them in the end. We also excluded 
articles that merely mentioned the finance industry. Our sample finally includes 58 articles. 
Although we refer to the “finance industry”, some articles in our sample refer to 
subgroups of the finance industry (e.g. hedge funds, banks, investment bank). We focus here 
on the phenomenon of stigma rather than the targets of stigma. As a result, the types of 
organizations targeted in articles vary because the boundaries of the stigmatized category are 
floating. Our research stream looked for a broad range of organizations to take in account this 
element. 
Analysis 
To analyze and code the texts, we used the online collaborative software Dedoose, 
which enables researchers to collaborate on a project remotely. Like other qualitative analysis 
softwares, Dedoose enables the researcher to code textual content. It also integrates 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 For example, for the Washington Post: (investment banks or bank or hedge funds or 
investment funds or finance industry) and (editorial or opinion or op-ed or pg=A16) and 
sn=washington post 
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quantitative tools. We used it to code the flaws of the industry on one side, and the rhetorical 
tools on the other.  
Aristotle, in his fundamental opus ‘The Art of Rhetoric’, built a typology of the 
‘means of persuasion’. He distinguishes the ethos - building the force of an argument on the 
trustworthiness of its source -, the pathos – appealing to the emotions of the reader -, and the 
logos – the use of reasoning to convince -. We used this typology to classify rhetorical 
strategies and their related arguments. In particular, this strategy enables us to see how this 
negative judgment is rationalized (logos) and “emotionalized” (pathos). 
Our coding strategy included three steps. First, we used a broad approach by coding 
negative judgments (the content) and stigmatization strategies (the form). Then, we looked at 
typical patterns in a subset of articles from our sample to create sub-categories. Two coders 
carried out this work separately. They reconciled and refined their coding scheme afterwards. 
Finally, the coding of sub-categories was conducted for the rest of the sample. When 
proceeding with this final phase, we also slightly refined and simplified our subcategories. 
Such discourse analysis commonly implies an abductive approach (Vaara and Monin, 2010; 
Dubois and Gadde, 2002). This modus operandi departs from initial hints, leading to 
speculations that are put under suspicion (Locke, Golden-Bilde and Feldman M, 2008). Our 
initial clues are based on the theoretical framework we developed earlier in this paper. The 
empirical part of this study is aimed at putting in doubt our theoretical conjecture. In the end, 
the objective is to build a new model based on the combination of our early framework and 
the understanding derived from the confrontation with reality (Dubois and Gadde, 2002). 
In addition, we performed an automatic content analysis using Yoshikoder. This 
applies content analysis dictionaries to count the number of words or expressions sorted out 
by psychologically meaningful categories. We used the LIWC dictionary, which includes 
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several language dimensions including negative and positive emotions (Pennebaker et al., 
2001). This enabled us to compare the tone of the articles analyzed. 
Methodological issues 
The criticism that can be made over the objectivity of our research is two-fold. Firstly, 
the literature suggests that a problem of selection bias affects the use of newspaper data for 
research purpose (Oliver and Maney, 2000). This selection bias is made obvious by the over 
representation of New York Times’ articles in our sample. However, our objective is to look 
at the charges against the finance industry, we thus naturally focus on investigating biased 
attacks. 
In addition, as posited by Leach (2000), rhetorical analysis creates arguments about 
arguments, and is by nature interpretive. Rhetorical analysis performed by two different 
persons might give different results because the investigation is made through the lens of the 
analyst. In addition, media texts can be subjected to various interpretations (Berger and 
Luckman, 1966). Even scientific discourse includes persuasive elements (Leach, 2000): 
research papers are no exceptions and it is accepted that the most scientific method in the 
social sciences cannot produce totally objective results (Berger and Luckman, 1966). In 
particular, we acknowledge that our interpretation of the texts is driven by our intent to adopt 
an institutional logic perspective on the stigma phenomenon. Our approach is necessarily 
subjective because a specific theoretical lens frames our analysis. In this sense, our research 
strategy is only partly inductive, and rather abductive: we posit that the institutional situation 
is as a sufficient but not necessary for the judgments we observe. Our study doesn’t aim at 
covering the whole range of antecedents of organizational stigma but rather at offering one 
possible explanation.  
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Findings 
Contextual elements 
Our sample of text is dominated by articles from the New York Times, one of the 
American media with the stronger left-wing bias, even for factual news (Groseclose and 
Milyo, 2005). Conversely, the Wall Street Journal, which is naturally considered as 
sympathetic to the finance industry, is underrepresented. As the shareholder model tends to be 
endorsed at the right of the political spectrum, this is consistent with the connection we make 
between shareholder value maximization logic and the finance industry. 
----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
----------------------------------------------- 
Rhetorical analysis requires taking in account the context in which texts are written 
(Jelzer, 2004). Thus, when analyzing our corpus, we consider the timeline and the related 
events: most of the articles are a reaction to an external circumstance associated with the 
finance industry. For example we observe a peak in the number of opinion articles in our 
sample in September 2008, with the fall of Lehman Brothers. However, textual analysis 
actually reveals that articles published around the same time period are usually spread over 
the full spectrum in terms of level of negative emotions (the proportion of words associated to 
negative emotions varies widely). The only exception is the collapse of Bear Stearns in March 
2008, where the vocabulary associated with negative emotions was unusually high. The 
surprise of the event can explain this situation. 
----------------------------------------------- 
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INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
----------------------------------------------- 
The opinion articles discussing the future of the financial sector or of the economy in 
general are also the ones that show the highest anxiety level: our analysis of the tone of the 
language used reveals a significant correlation between the two groups of words. It reveals the 
apprehension this topic generates: the virulence of the attacks can be seen as a consequence of 
the uncertainty. We also naturally observe that the vocabulary of money is associated with the 
phraseology of causation. It can imply that from the writers point of view, greed is at the roots 
of the crisis: in popular images, greed is a driving value of the banking industry.  
----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
----------------------------------------------- 
Rhetorical strategies 
Several rhetorical techniques are used by the writers to make their point. Our objective 
is to see how they point towards a set of well-identified values and behaviors relying on the 
field-level logic. 
Denomination of the bankers: The authors commonly use “Wall Street” as an appellation for 
the banking industry (it appears in almost 20% of the titles): this circumscribing tag suggests 
the industry is “bunkerized” and disconnected with realities and the rest of the society. From a 
logic perspective, it stresses the conflict between the field-level rationales and the common 
good. They also use various defaming denominations to designate the bankers or the actors of 
the industry. Some are related to their rapacity - “money moguls”, “rascals”, “hyenas” – while 
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some other suggest immaturity and childish behaviors - “baby faced”, “boy scouts”, “young 
gung-ho traders”, “big guys”, “right-out-of-business-schools” -. Both dimensions relate to 
individualism, a value at the core of the shareholder value model. Bankers are accused to 
work for themselves without caring about the societal consequences of their action. The two 
dimensions however refer to differing bankers’ features. The first group of denomination 
focuses on bankers’ behavior: they are perceived as voluntary attitudes. The second group is 
more of a passive attribute. Bankers are not only criticized for what they do and the way they 
do it, but also for who they are. These denominations appeal to the pathos of the readers as 
they are aimed at mocking and sparking off anger over the behaviors of bankers. 
Metaphors, comparisons and images: Metaphors are figures of speech that compare two 
things that are not necessarily comparable. Together with comparisons and images they 
appeal to both the logos and the pathos: (i) the logos because they recall a more familiar 
situation where the rationale against the banks’ behaviors or values will be easier to grasp (ii) 
the pathos because they make readers visualize a context that carries a stronger emotional 
weight. The most common metaphors are about the ill-considered risks taken by banks. 
Financial markets are a “casino”, where banks play with “other people’s money” to the 
“Russian roulette”. Images are also used to depict the field as a savage environment. In this 
“African savannah”, the weakest elements (e.g. Bear Sterns) are absorbed by the most 
opportunistic actors. Although no rules apply in this setting and only the strongest survive, it 
is a fragile “house of card” where a gust can sweep away not only the industry but the rest of 
the economic system. Similarly, the writers also sometimes picture the actors of the field by 
engaging the reader with expressions such as “imagine”, or “think of”. The objective is to 
help the reader to visualize a situation considered as shocking or absurd. 
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Interacting with the reader: An important element of the logos is to involve the reader in the 
writer’s line of reasoning. In our sample, we observe two main ways to interact with the 
readers. First, the writers tend to engage the audience with interrogative sentences: “Why 
not...?”, “But so what?”, “Is it possible?”. The idea is to make the readers think by themselves 
to come to the same conclusion than the writer. In addition, the writer tends to anticipate 
potential validity concerns about the arguments made against the banks’ and bankers’ 
behaviors and values. He or she will then use the perspective of its target: how would finance 
actors answer to his or her arguments? The shareholder value maximization logic has its own 
rationales for typical field behaviors. To go deeper in the analysis of the delegitimization 
strategies, we now have to look at the specific behaviors that are targeted in the opinion 
articles and how the writers link them to broader logics and institutional contexts. 
Moving boundaries: Stigma is a categorization process and as a consequence the boundaries 
of the stigmatized category tend to vary. The denomination used to designate the category 
reflects this variation. From some points of view, only a branch of the finance industry 
deserves to be stigmatized, while some other perspective defend the idea that the flaw is 
shared among all finance actors, basically that the same logic binds them all. In some cases, 
the author begins by using a broad designation in the title and the first lines (e.g. “Wall 
Street”), then use a specific subset of the finance industry (necessarily a subset that is closer to 
the field-level logic i.e. investment banks with no retail activities) to make a specific 
argument about the flaws of these organizations when this s and then broaden again the 
speech to stretch out the range of targeted actors. Focusing or enlarging the scope of the 
stigmatizing category is thus another rhetorical strategies, because (i) focusing enables the 
author to make a case on a small sample for which the institutional contradiction is obvious 
and (ii) enlarging opens the possibility to generalize a point to a broader range of 
organizations. 
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Field-level logic and stigmatized behaviors 
Through the analysis of the rhetorical strategies, we have suggested that the main 
objective of the writer was to discredit the underlying logic of the field. As a part of this 
process, the writers do their best to dismantle the rationales on which the bankers and banks’ 
behaviors are based.  
Bonuses as an embodiment of the agency perspective: The rationale for bonuses in the finance 
industry is built on agency arguments (Ho, 2009): the actors of the finance industry are paid 
proportionally to the revenues they generate for their organization and are thus incentivized to 
do better at work. When the writers attack this behavior, they anticipate the justification 
formulated by the bankers themselves to defend such system. The first argument that can be 
opposed by the industry is that these exceptional revenues reflect the wealth generated and the 
societal: 
Is it possible that what Wall Street does is three times more valuable to society than other 
well-paid occupations? 
The huge social costs [...] refute the notion that Wall Street consistently creates exceptional 
economic value that justifies exceptional compensation. 
Washington Post - 18 January 2010 
The authors focus on explaining why it can be actually detrimental for shareholders, 
clearly assuming that the bonus schemes are initially targeted at contributing to shareholder 
value. The fact that the bonus system is embedded in the shareholder value maximization 
logic is taken for granted by stigmatizing actors. The reason why bonus schemes are harmful 
to shareholders is because it is primarily driven by the “great masterpiece of self-interest”. 
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The alignment of interest - the main rationale in favor of agency theory – is repeatedly put 
into question, in line with the recent scholarly criticism regarding the shareholder value 
maximization (Stout, 2012; Clarke, 2013). 
The systemic drawbacks of risk-taking behaviors: The rationale for extreme risk-taking 
behaviors being unclear, writers put less efforts in anticipating potential justifications. These 
behaviors are however recognized as a by-product of the shareholder value maximization 
logic (Bradley and Sudaram, 2003; Ho, 2009; Whitman, 1999), because it reflects an 
entrepreneurial mindset. Risk-taking attitudes are mainly discredited through figures of 
speech or telling images rather than more complex logical lines of arguments. The systemic 
consequences of these behaviors are emphasized: when referring to the bankers’ risk-taking 
behaviors, the writers recall the global consequences of the crisis. The intent is to show how 
these behaviors are incompatible with common good. 
The greater problem is that [the bonus system] provides an incentive to take risks. The 
asymmetric nature of the bonus (an incentive for success without a corresponding 
disincentive for failure) causes hidden risks to accumulate in the financial system and become 
a catalyst for disaster. [...]  
[Bonuses] invite bankers to game the system by hiding the risks of rare and hard-to-predict 
but consequential blow-ups, 
New York Times – 8 November 2011 
The relationship between risk-taking and systemic disruption is pictured as a vicious circle. 
They force governments to intervene, such as in the Bear Stearns case, encouraging risk-
taking even more by eliminating the potential downside consequences. Even from the Wall 
Street Journal perspective, a rather sympathetic outlet (Groseclose and Milyo, 2005), this is a 
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self-defeating principle for the shareholder value maximization logic, which supposedly 
favors a small government.   
[After the bailout] We will have a new de facto federal policy of underwriting Wall Street that 
will encourage even more reckless risk-taking. And Lehman took more risks than most. 
The Wall Street Journal - 12 September 2008 
 
Opacity and lobbying as a signal of institutional resistance: The finance industry is accused 
to have built a system of “legalized bribery” based upon a strong lobbying. The writers depict 
the field as a “fortress”, being able to resist change, because of “the complicity of regulators”. 
While the government is expected to intervene, two potential obstacles are raised. First, the 
articles denounce the collusion between authorities and the financial sector. The bankers are 
presented as “buying” the government. : 
U.S. congressmen should have to dress like Nascar drivers and wear the logos of all the 
banks, investment banks, insurance companies and real estate firms that they're taking money 
from. 
New York Times – 30 October 2011 
Second, the complexity and the opaqueness of the financial industry are seen as 
obstacles to any external intervention:  
The risk of a financial meltdown introduced by companies intertwined through Byzantine 
financial transactions imposes a burden on the government as real as pollution. 
New York Times – 17 September 2008 
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Several opinion articles in 2011 draw attention to the fact that regulation has so far 
proven unable to affect the behaviors of bankers, in particular the bonus system and the 
tendency to take extreme risks. The lobbying activities and the opacity of the industry are 
presented as a response to the institutional pressures: it suggests that the field-level logic is 
able to resist coercion. This resistance is depicted as built on corruption. Money is shown as 
the central commodity for the members of the field, and is naturally pointed out as the tool 
used to buy support.  
Similarly to the bonus system, opacity is seen as an issue for the survival of the field 
itself. 
This is sort of like a confessional where the priest delivers a public opinion on the extent of 
your virtues or sins, and your spouse has to guess what a AAA or BBB means about your 
fidelity. 
New York Times – 2 November 2007 
 
Finally, we can classify the stigmatizing arguments against the finance industry 
according to the dimension of the institutional context they refer to in order to make their 
point. In addition to institutional contradiction - the inconsistencies between different logics - 
(Seo and Creed, 2002), and institutional resistance – when institutional logics survive despite 
inconsistencies – (Marquis and Lounsbury, 2007), we propose the concept of logical 
inconsistency. Many of the attacks we have identified have shown how the shareholder value 
maximization logic contradicts itself, suggesting a lack of internal coherence. We have seen 
that there are five main flaws targeted by the stigmatizing rhetoric: the bonus system, the risk-
taking behaviors, extreme individualism, survival of the fittest and seclusion of the industry. 
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Table 2 crosses the two dimensions and summarizes how, in the argumentation, the 
stigmatizing references to those flaws illustrate three different aspects of the institutional 
situation: (i) the attacks stressing the contradiction between the field-level logic and the 
common good or higher order logics (ii) the attacks suggesting that the field-level logic resist 
to external pressure (iii) the attacks showing that the field-level logic is not consistent and can 
actually be detrimental to the field itself.  
----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
----------------------------------------------- 
In the end, the shareholder value maximization logic is not seen as a source of 
inspiration for the field-level logic, as previous studies have suggested (Ho, 2009). Instead, 
the field itself is perceived as breathing life into the shareholder value maximization logic and 
spreading it to the rest of the economy, while it actually preexisted to the rise of the finance 
industry: 
Finance set the terms of corporate behavior over the past quarter-century, and not in ways 
that bolstered the economy. By its actions -- elevating shareholder value over the interests of 
other corporate stakeholders, focusing on short-term investments rather than patient capital, 
pressuring corporations to offshore jobs and cut wages and benefits – Wall Street plainly 
preferred to fund production abroad. [...] Wall Street turned its back on America. 
Washington Post – 19 September 2008 
Discussion and conclusive remarks  
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In this study, we have explored the techniques used by stigmatizing actors to convince 
and spread their belief. We have shown that this emerging “stigma-theory” against the finance 
industry was targeting the field-level logic of shareholder value maximization. The 
stigmatizing rhetoric targets both the practices (e.g. extreme risk-taking, the bonus schemes 
and the opacity) implied by the logic and its underlying values, beliefs and assumptions (e.g. 
the pay-per-performance principle, the “high risk-high reward” culture, or simply 
individualism). While the practices are directly targeted, in most of the cases the coherence on 
which they are based is also confronted. 
The targeted category of organizations is discredited through the delegitimization of 
its underlying logic. These logics are the common denominator to these organizations and 
ultimately contribute to the categorization process. Using a broad array of rhetorical tools - 
including metaphors and comparisons, calling to the rationality of the reader, or arousing 
strong emotions -, the bankers’ archetypal behaviors are critically examined. We however see 
that the authors go beyond the behaviors themselves to attack the rationales and the values 
that motivate them, i.e. the underlying institutional logic. When referring to bonuses, they 
anticipate the reasoning on which they are built (the agency perspective, the alignment of 
interest between shareholders and employees, etc.), and deconstruct these justifications. 
Similarly, when they criticize risk-taking attitudes, they stress the possible damages for the 
society and for the risk-takers and their peers. As stressed by Harney (2011), extreme risk 
taking and speculative behaviors, in their headlong rush, seem to ironically ignore the 
potential consequences. Manipulating the boundaries of the stigmatized category is also used 
as a tool to generalize the negative features of some organizations to a wider range of actors. 
This has implications regarding stigma contagion (or courtesy stigma (Goffman, 1963)): 
stigma transfer is at least partially the consequence of a strategy of stigmatizing actors to 
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convince their audience. However, stigma is not only about rhetoric, as rhetoric is only a 
bridge between condemned features of the finance industry and broader order concepts. 
We identify institutional conflict as a necessary but not sufficient condition to generate 
organizational stigma. The contradiction between societal logics and the common good on 
one side, and the industry logic – which are presented as secluded from reality and 
maladaptive, and even harmful for the field itself – is put at the center of the stigmatizing 
argumentation. This dialectic gives substance to the institutional resistance of the finance 
industry logic. Although this logic originated in the societal rationale of shareholder value 
maximization, its consequences have made it non grata. One of the designated logic actually 
exemplifies this resistance: because the finance industry is opaque and can use the power of 
money to corrupt potential opponents, it can endure pressures from societal level logics and 
delay institutional change. We suggest that this opposition leads stigmatizing actors to 
perceive the finance industry as a source of diffusion rather than an embodiment of the 
stigmatized logic. While it has been established that the finance industry has rebuilt itself after 
the 1929 crisis by adopting a widely accepted societal logic (Ho, 2009), the editorial articles 
of our sample introduce it not only as an epitome but also as a source of dissemination. 
History is distorted to make a more compelling case against the targeted category of 
organizations. If we follow Ho’s demonstration, we can hypothesize that the banking field 
will end up yielding to institutional pressures and deriving new logics from more consensual 
societal level values. 
The main contribution of this work is to combine the literature on organizational 
stigma and institutional logics. On one side, we extend the literature on institutional 
contradiction by focusing on the consequences of logic resistance. The focus of this study is 
the “period [of] intensive political contestation and negotiation among the key constituencies” 
that precedes institutional change (Seo and Creed, 2002: 243), and in this sense our research 
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empirically explores the dynamics of institutional struggle. On the other side, we contribute to 
the literature on organizational stigma by showing how this phenomenon can be an outcome 
of conflicting logics. By using a logic lens, this study enriches the theorization of stigma and 
disapproval of organizations. If the causes of stigma are partly identified in the current 
literature, understanding the construction and the emergence of such occurrence enlightens 
the role of language. Rather than seeing stigma as a purely rhetorical process, I present 
rhetoric as a filter to analyze the defaming arguments and connect them with broader- order 
constructs. Although the stigma phenomenon has been well defined (Devers et al., 2009), it is 
necessary to link it up to broader theoretical frameworks to better understand its antecedents 
and consequences, and ultimately be able to prevent it. In addition, while most of the 
literature on stigma is theoretical (Hudson, 2008; Pozner, 2008; Devers et al., 2009; Mishina 
and Devers, 2011), this article provides some empirical exploration of the phenomenon.  
This work is however not exempt of limitations. I adopt an abductive approach to 
establish that institutional contradiction is sufficient but not necessary to generate 
organizational stigma. In other terms, I establish one possible condition to generate a category 
of stigmatized organizations. This approach implies that other antecedents to organizational 
stigma as a form of illegitimacy may exist. For example, Vergne (2012) or Galvin et al. 
(2004) identify the association with death as an antecedent of stigmatization. Here, the norm 
violation is related to the action of killing. The action of killing is however perceived as 
ordinary at the field-level. Thus this kind of norm violation can also be connected to a conflict 
between logics at different levels. Another potential limitation regarding the generalizability 
of the findings comes from the specificity of the finance industry as a stigmatized category. If 
we consider other stigmatized categories, is it as easy to identify a field-level dominant logic 
and a contradicting societal logic? In the case of the finance industry, the practices derived 
from the shareholder value maximization logic are easily spotted. For other fields, such as the 
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tobacco industry, the practices related to the free-market logic are not as well-defined (Galvin, 
et al. 2004). In addition, a same logic can lead to variance in the prevalence of the related 
practices, depending on the cultural context (Roulet and Touboul, 2014). 
This study opens different paths for future research. In particular: what are the 
strategies used by organizations to face stigma? Organizations tend to prevent stigma 
contagion rather than confront it (Hudson and Okhuysen, 2009). One strategy employed by 
some organizations is isolation from the stigmatized category by creating a positive 
distinctiveness (Hargie, Stapleton and Tourish, 2010; Riaz, Buchanan and Bapuji, 2011; 
Durand and Vergne, 2014). For example, Robert Wilmers, the CEO of M&T bank in the US, 
put a lot of energy in presenting his organization as fundamentally different from the “bad 
banks” during the financial crisis. Another pro-active strategy is to defend the underlying 
values and beliefs that are under attack. In the aftermath of the 2007 crisis, we have seen a 
number of bankers giving grounds for the received bonuses. Finally, the last option is to 
accept stigma. Despite stigma, individuals (Goffman, 1963) but also industries (Galvin, et al. 
2004) can survive. Despite stigma, banks might be able to remain unchanged. 
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Figure 1 - Antecedents and consequences of resistant industry-level logics 
 
Figure 2 - Source and date of the sampled articles 
              
Figure 3 - Proportion of words associated with negative emotions by article 
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Table 1 - Correlation table for vocabulary content 
  Affect Anger Anxiety Causation Certainty Future Money Motion Negation 
Negative 
Emotion Past Sadness 
Affect 1 0.285* 0.155 0.139 0.0825 0.174 0.195 0.0649 0.00465 0.546*** 0.0388 0.354** 
Anger   1 0.169 0.109 -0.044 0.069 0.176 0.0355 -0.157 0.392** 0.0883 -0.0475 
Anxiety     1 0.0793 -0.0953 0.318* 0.101 0.398** -0.122 0.266* -0.0389 -0.131 
Cause       1 0.126 -0.0676 0.306* 0.00347 -0.0198 0.165 -0.136 -0.0744 
Certainty         1 0.177 0.157 0.227 0.215 0.0703 0.144 0.143 
Future           1 -0.081 0.328* 0.127 0.137 -0.246 0.0121 
Money             1 -0.0847 -0.270* 0.149 -0.0867 -0.0407 
Motion               1 0.221 0.145 -0.0677 -0.0359 
Negation                 1 0.111 0.276* 0.185 
Negative 
Emotion                   1 0.195 0.646*** 
Past                     1 0.0463 
Sadness                       1 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001         
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Table 2 - The flaws of the finance industry and the three dimensions of the 
institutional context 
 
Flaws of the finance 
industry 
Institutional 
contradiction 
Institutional 
resistance 
Logical 
inconsistency 
Bonuses - Source of inequality  
- Detrimental to 
shareholders 
Risk-taking behaviors - Threat to the economic system  
- Force the 
intervention of the 
government. 
Greed and individualism - Threat to the economic system 
- Self-interest 
resistance to 
change 
- Detrimental to 
shareholders 
Survival of the fittest - Threat to the economic system 
- Logic 
embeddedness as a 
factor of survival  
Seclusion of the industry - Disconnection  with reality 
- Lobby against 
change  
 
